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THE EFFECT OF THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT ON THE
CONSOLIDATION OF PRIVATE AIR LAW CONVENTIONS
By PAUL B. LARSEN"
I. A TRILOGY OF CONVENTIONS
T HE WARSAW CONVENTION ceased long ago to offer total regula-
tion of air transport. In 1929, when aviation involved a few passengers
and light planes, its coverage of problem areas was nearly all-encompassing.
Today, however, potential participants have multiplied, as accidents like
the 1960 Staten Island collision' so surprisingly show. If that collision
had involved a foreign carrier and a domestic carrier, both flying under
positive air traffic control, and the falling airplane parts had caused exten-
sive ground damage,' the participants whose relationships would be directly
affected are these: (1.) Passengers and shippers; (2.) Third persons on
the surface; (3.) Operators of the two planes; and (4.) The Air Traffic
Control Agency (ATC). If several parties are at fault, and in varying
degrees are causes of the accident (e.g., one carrier is 61 percent at fault,
the other carrier 15 percent at fault and the control tower 24 percent
at fault'), the situation well overlaps the context of passenger-shipper
versus carrier which is the subject matter of the Warsaw Convention.
In fact, the Warsaw Convention could no longer be relied upon to cover
the passenger-shipper-operator relationship even if one only considers the
presently increasing amount of general aviation. Those non-Warsaw areas
which are regulated, are covered by only weak restrictions. A major avia-
tion problem, facing governments today, is whether the ancillary conven-
tions should be freed of Warsaw influence, or tied more significantly to it.
A. The Unique Influence Of The Warsaw Convention On
Air Transport Regulation
Since 1929, developing aviation technology has quickly produced areas
of air transport not regulated by Warsaw. The tendency has been to fill
these gaps by separate conventions. A trilogy concept developed which
was thought could solve all legal problems of international air transport:
the Warsaw Convention regulating the operators' relationships with pas-
t Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Senior Editor, J. AIR L.
& CoM.
'Note, Governmental Liability-The December 1960 Air Disaster-Is Executive Settlement
Desirable?, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 281 (1964).
a In the Staten Island collision compensation for surface damage amounted to about one million
dollars. 1966 Report of the ICAO Legal Committee Subcommittee on the Rome Convention, 32 J.
AIR L. & COM. 426. (1966). Compensation to passengers and shippers amounted to about twelve
million dollars, supra note I, at 286.
'These are the actual percentages worked out in the settlement of the Staten Island collision,
supra note 2.
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sengers and shippers;4 the Rome Convention on Surface Damages to regu-
late the operators' relationships with innocent third parties;s and a third
convention on aerial collisions now in draft form, which would govern
claims between the innocent and culpable operator, and also between the
passengers and shippers on the innocent plane and the culpable operator.'
The Warsaw Convention is the oldest, the most successful, and the
most influential convention in the trilogy. Although the Rome Conven-
tion has adopted a system of absolute liability coupled with liability limits,
which are higher than those of the Warsaw Convention," it is still tied
down by Warsaw precedence. For example, during the recent negotiations
for higher limits in the Rome Convention, it was generally felt that a
raising of the limits should attract more states to sign the convention.'
However, the subcommittee concluded that such a move would be un-
wise "until the outcome of present and future deliberations about the
Warsaw Convention was known."' Now, the third part of the trilogy,
the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, has adopted in its Article 5
the Warsaw regime"0 of presumed liability of the operator in order to
place all passengers and shippers on the two colliding aircraft in the same
situation, vis a vis, the aircraft operator who caused the collision." The
Warsaw liability system was adopted here in spite of the fact that there
is no contractual relationship between the passengers and shippers on the
plane which was hit and the operator who caused the collision. The Draft
Convention on Aerial Collisions also has adopted the Warsaw liability
limits as they are modified by the Hague Protocol," in spite of the United
States efforts to raise those limits." The general desire in the ICAO Legal
Committee for uniformity with the Warsaw Convention was too strong
for the United States to dislodge."* The other two conventions are clearly
' Gaps in the operators' relationship with passengers and shippers were filled by the Protocol to
Amend the Warsaw Convention (hereinafter the Hague Protocol), 28 Sept. 1955, 1955 U.S. &
Can. Av. 521, extending the Warsaw Convention to employees; and by the Convention Supple-
mentary to the Warsaw Convention (hereinafter Guadalajara Convention), 18 Sept. 1961, 1963
U.S. & Can. Av. 313, reprinted in 28 J. Amp L. & CoM. 45 (1961), regulating carriage by air
performed by a person other than a contracting carrier.
a Convention on Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (hereinafter Rome
Convention), 29 May 1933, reprinted in 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, 83 (3rd ed.
1966), followed by its replacement, the 1952 Rome Convention, 7 Oct. 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181
(1958), reprinted in 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, Id. at 157, and in 19 J. Ast L. & CoM. 447
(1952).
'Only a draft convention on aerial collisions (hereinafter the Draft Convention on Aerial Col-
lisions) has been produced, ICAO Doc. 8582-LC/153-2 at 281 (1964).
$33,164 limit on fatalities in the Rome Convention (Art. 11) compared with $8,291 in
the Warsaw Convention (Art. 22).
'Proposal of Mexico for Examination of the Rome Convention of 1952, supra note 6, at 163;
see 1966 Report of the ICAO Subcommittee on the Rome Convention, supra note 2, at 434
regarding United States emphasis on higher limits, "that the United States of America which had
formerly been opposed to a single forum and to the requirement of execution of the judgments of
that forum had since made it be known that these provisions would not constitute a major obstacle
to ratification of the other provisions of the Convention, particularly those relating to limits of
liability were satisfactory."
9Id. at 431.
"°Warsaw Convention, Arts. 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21.
"ICAO Doc. LC/SC/ Aerial Collisions No. 72 at 8-9 (1961).
"9 Limits provided by the Warsaw Convention Art. 22, as amended by the Hague Protocol Art.
XI are: Each person killed, impaired or delayed, 250,000 gold francs ($16,582); Objects carried
by a person, 5,000 gold francs ($331.64); Baggage, Cargo, Mail delayed, damaged or lost: 250
gold francs per kilo ($16.50).
aaICAO Doc. 8582-LC/153-1 at 103 (1964).
14 id. at 106.
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subordinate youngsters which can scarcely hope to be free of the Warsaw
parental influence.
B. Breakdown Of The Trilogy Concept
Administration of air traffic control (hereinafter ATC) has, in recent
years, become very important to air transport. It was felt by many at the
1964 ICAO Legal Committee meeting that ATC liability was a much
more serious issue than that of aerial collisions. 5 This of course has been
borne out by the number of suits against ATC in the United States."
The appearance of the ATC liability issue brought home the difficulty in-
volved in having air transport regulated by an increasing number of
separate conventions which fail to establish coordinated regulation on a
systematic basis. For example, the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions
provides that if it is impossible to prove the fault of either of the carriers
involved in the collision, then they shall share in the liability for the dam-
age "in proportion to the weight of the respective aircraft.""' Suppose,
however, that both aircraft involved in the collision were under positive
air traffic control and that only ATC was at afult. The carriers would still
be held liable under the collisions convention."6
It is particularly the proper regulation of recourse actions which has
proved the weakness of a system of separate liability conventions, for
potential recourse actions increase in direct ratio to the number of con-
ventions. For a Staten Island-type collision, involving varying degrees of
fault of both operators and air traffic controllers, the Draft Convention
on Aerial Collisions provides that its liability limits may not be exceeded. 9
This means that if the ATC agency is sued directly by a passenger, who
recovers $500,000, it can only recover up to the limit of the convention
($16,582) from the two carriers, and loses the remainder0 though the
agency is only twenty-four percent at fault. Mr. Kean, the United King-
dom representative, observed that in writing a separate convention on aerial
collisions, the ICAO Legal Committee had incidentally "produced the ex-
traordinary system under which an air traffic control agency had its right
" The International Union of Aviation Insurers, supra note 6, at 232, argued that "since when
flying under instrument flight rules, or at very high speeds, the chief responsibility for the avoidance
of collisions normally rests with Air Traffic Control and will do so to an increasing extent as
speeds go up and the possibility of 'avoiding action' diminishes in consequence."
'6 Representative suits in which the Government has been held liable are: Furumizo v. United
States, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967) (Turbulence); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir. 1967) (weather information); Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (separation of traffic); Maryland v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D. D.C. 1966)
(separation of traffic); Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964) (sepa-
ration of traffic).
" Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, Art. 7.
" Compare remarks by Mr. Crawford of the United States delegation to the 1964 session of
the ICAO Legal Committee, supra note 13, at 91.
" Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, Art. 8: "[A] n operator shall not be liable in any action
in recourse by another operator or by any other person for the payment of any sum which would
result in his liability exceeding any applicable limits of liability under this Convention or any other
international convention."
"°Note the remarks by the observer from Eurocontrol, Mr. Outers, who at the 1964 ICAO
Legal Committee meeting "pointed out an injustice which could arise in the case of an air traffic
control agency whose right of recourse was based on Article 8 of the draft Convention and, there-
fore, subject to the limits of the Convention. It might happen that an air traffic control agency,
which was only ten percent liable might have to bear the whole of the damages and in recourse
action against an operator who was ninety percent liable be subject to limits under the convention,"
supra note 13, at 137.
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of recourse limited... ." Indeed, Sir Richard Wilberforce saw no reason for
limiting passenger action against carriers if claims against ATC were un-
limited." Under the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement,
a passenger's estate can recover $75,000 from the airline on which he was
carried under the absolute liability clause of the Montreal Agreement.
However, even if the airline is not at fault or only five percent at fault, it
can only recover up to $16,5 82 in a recourse action against another operator
under the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, and from ATC, only
up to whatever limit is established in an ATC Liability Convention.2"
The trilogy concept did not break down solely because recourse actions
became a problem. Other reasons have been that the Rome Convention
failed to find general acceptance among states, an Aerial Collisions Con-
vention has been delayed year after year, and the Warsaw Convention
inadequately regulated passengers' and shippers' relationships with their
carriers. A tantalizing suggestion then arises: why should there not be an
attempt to combine all liability problems in one convention? 4
II. THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR A CONSOLIDATED CONVENTION
Although the influence of the Warsaw Convention on the regulation of
surface damage, aerial collisions and air traffic control is demonstrable, and
the need to correlate regulation of all air transport liability problems seems
evident, it must be noted that little is being done about consolidation.
Naturally, the states with high concentration of air transport are those
most caught up in the complex of participants, which clog the way to a
fair financial solution after an accident. Consequently, the United States
began early to argue for consolidation of aerial collisions and ATC
liability but the 1960 session of the ICAO Legal Committee decided not
to combine the two.'
In 1964 the United States raised the issue of consolidation on a broader
scale, proposing to the ICAO Legal Committee a combined regulation
of surface damage, aerial collisions and air traffic control liability," but
excluding passengers and shippers claims against their carriers. Reduction
of litigation, by lessening the need for separate recourse actions after
successful direct actions, was a major reason for the new suggestion. Re-
tention of the Warsaw Convention intact would still offer some obstacles,
however, for when a passenger's estate recovered $75,000 under the War-
" Id. at 13 3.
21 ICAO Doc. 8137-LC/147-1 at 174 (1960). Generally see Miyagi, "Applicable Limits of
Liability" under Article 8 of the 1964 Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, 32 J. AIR L. &
COM. 195 (1966).
" The recourse situation would be the same if the innocent operator in a collision were com-
pelled to pay compensation for a fatality on the surface. In fact the absolute liability system of
the interim agreement makes the operator's recourse action even more difficult, provoking Sincoff
to remark that "[T]he absolute liability regime produces the unfair effect of requiring only the air
carrier to compensate damages up to $75,000.00 when another concurrently causes the accident,"
Sincoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages in International Aviation Accidents, 33 J. AIR
L. & COM. 147, 153 (1967).
4This idea has been expressed by several ICAO Legal Committee members, including P. J.
Swart, supra note 13, at 35.
25Remarks by Mr. Boyle, delegate of the United States, ICAO Doc., supra note 22, at 167.
The United States motion was supported by the United Kingdom, Id. at 168, and by Switzerland,
Id. at 171; but the Legal Committee decision against the motion was made by a 13-10 vote, Id. at
176.s United States letter of 27 July 1964 to ICAO, supra note 6, at 227.
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saw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement, the carrier
would still have to seek recourse against other carriers and against ATC
under the consolidated convention. The Proposal was not acceptable to
the ICAO Legal Committee. Instead it decided to consider aerial collisions
separately and instructed its ATC Subcommittee to proceed in the direction
of a separate convention for air traffic control liability."
III. AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES WITHIN A CONSOLIDATED CONVENTION
A. Liability Systems
The most useful perspective on the question of liability systems is from
the point of view of the four different types of claimants: passengers and
shippers, people on the surface, aircraft operators, and air traffic control
agencies.
1. A Consolidated Convention Based Uniformly on Absolute Liability
PASSENGERS AND SHIPPERS: The United States evidently decided,
when insisting on absolute liability in the 1966 Montreal Agreement, that
this was the best system for passengers and shippers claims against operators.
Without questioning further the reasons behind the decision, it immediately
appears that if this is the Administration's firm policy, it can have far
reaching influence on the consolidation issue, for Warsaw, under the
Montreal Agrement, will shed its light on the other conventions, as it
always does. For example, the ICAO Legal Committee philosophy is that
a fair social policy is to ensure that the passengers and shippers of both
carriers involved in a collision are granted the same chances of recovery
from the culpable operators." If absolute liability is the system of re-
covery from one carrier, it will also be the same from the other carrier.
Likewise, if absolute liability is in effect for passengers' and shippers' re-
covery from air carriers, it will ethically have to be the system under
which passengers' and shippers' claims against ATC are managed.
PEOPLE ON THE SURFACE: The Rome Convention already has a
policy of air carriers' absolute liability for surface damage, to which the
United States no longer objects," so there would be no difficulty in con-
solidating surface owners claims with those of passengers and shippers
under a system of absolute liability.
AIRCRAFT OPERATORS: Can claims of operators be regulated by a
general absolute liability system? In the Staten Island-type hypothetical
illustration, where two operators and ATC are all at fault and in varying
degrees, payment of the claims can be adjusted by the court, as it is in
any other case where parties are jointly liable. Of course, if only one
operator is sued by passengers or shippers it would be in his interest to
join other potential defendants. In fact, the operator should be required
to do so. This system of apportionment would solve the problem of re-
course actions in a consolidated convention based on absolute liability.
2 7 Supra note 13, at 142. The ICAO Legal Committee did not preclude the subcommittee from
considering alternative solutions.
28 Supra note 11.
"The United States abandoned its objection to this principle of liability at the 1966 meeting
of the Subcommittee on the Rome Convention, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 426 (1966); the reason for
the policy change is explained in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 558-61 (1967).
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But another question arises: in a collision, can absolute liability be made
to regulate the operator's claim for damages against a second operator or
by ATC? The Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions provides for a
separate liability system based on fault for this particular relationship,0
which seems to indicate a feeling that operators claims are in a different
category than those of passengers. The United States Consolidation Pro-
posal strongly supports a proof of fault liability system for operators
claims against each other and against ATC." Obviously, certain difficulties
exist in drawing operators' direct claims within a consolidated convention
based uniformly on absolute liability.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENCIES: Recourse claims by ATC
against other potential defendants would be required to be impleaded in
the same way and for the same reasons as would operators' recourse claims.
Direct claims by ATC presumably would be for damage caused by air-
plane parts falling from planes in the air upon controllers, control towers
and equipment, and here ATC would be grouped with property owners
on the surface and should be entitled to absolute liability.
It appears, then, that the Montreal Agreement's basis of absolute liability
could serve as the uniform system for air transport. It would regulate
recourse actions and provide uniformity of law. The greatest argument
for an exception within a consolidated convention would be in the area of
aircraft operators' direct claims against each other and their claims against
ATC.
2. A Consolidated Convention Based on Several Liability Systems
Before the United States changed its policy from presumed fault to
absolute liability, it had imagined a consolidated convention based on
varying liability systems for the different types of claimants. From the
participants' point of view such a convention would assume the follow-
ing appearance.
PASSENGERS AND SHIPPERS: The United States Consolidation Pro-
posal excludes passengers' and shippers' claims against their carriers, thereby
allowing either the Warsaw Convention's regime of presumed fault or
the Montreal Agreement's regime of absolute liability, to remain in effect.
At the same time, the proposal includes claims by passengers and shippers
on the innocent plane involved in a collision. This is based on the theory
that, in a consolidated convention, these parties should be entitled to
either absolute liability or to presumption of fault, but they should be
given the choice of a proof of fault system if they wished to remove a
limitation upon their recovery. Claims by passengers and shippers against
ATC would be based on their proving fault of the ATC Agency."2
PEOPLE ON THE SURFACE: Absolute liability or presumption of
fault, with the option of proving fault if the claimant wanted no limit on
his recovery, would also be in effect for surface claimants."
AIRCRAFT OPERATORS: Recourse actions by operators would be
based on proof of fault with damages apportioned by the court depend-
's Supra note 6, at Art. 4.





ing on the tortfeasors' degree of fault."4 Their direct actions against other
operators and ATC agencies would be based on proof of fault.'
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENCIES: Recourse actions would be
treated like those of the operators" and their direct actions would probably
be classified with other damage to people on the surface.
A consolidated convention, based on several liability systems, would
also regulate recourse actions, however, it would not provide uniformity
of law.
3. A Consolidated Convention on Surface, Aerial Collisions and Air Traffic
Control Damage Only.
An attempted distinction between contractual and noncontractual lia-
bility is embedded in the United States Proposal. Such a scheme would
leave the Warsaw Convention as a separate contractual entity (together
with the Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara Convention), and would
consolidate liability for surface, aerial collisions and air traffic control dam-
age in the manner described under Section 2, supra." But, the distinction
between contractual and noncontractual liability is not clear, and is in
the process of being broken down. Relief under the Warsaw Convention
is not limited to contractual recovery, as a study of United States case
law makes quite clear. " Furthermore, in the Draft Convention on Aerial
Collisions, a Warsaw-type recovery is provided for all passengers and
shippers against the operator who caused the collision regardless of which
plane involved in the collision has contracted carriage. Such a situation
led Mr. Swart, the Netherlands delegate to the 1964 ICAO Committee,
to conclude that "the Warsaw Convention which had never been limited
to contractual liability, could not be separated from the Draft Conven-
tion on Aerial Collisions." 9
It is reasonable to state that the need for this rather strained distinction
between contractual and noncontractual liability has been reduced sig-
nificantly by the 1966 Montreal Agreement. Its change in liability system
has brought it closer to the other subject matters as indicated in Section 1,
supra, so that a re-evaluation of the liability basis in the United States
Proposal certainly is in place.
Elimination of recourse actions was the main objective of the United
States Consolidation Proposal. It need hardly be stated that consolidation
of only three out of the four subject matters leaving out the major area
of law suits, the Warsaw Convention, does not solve the growing re-
course problem.
B. Limitation On Liability.
Since the trend toward a limitation on liability in air transport is, as
indicated in the ICAO deliberations, so strong that it is not likely to be
m Id. at 230.35 id. at 229.
-Id. at 230.
3 Deleting, of course, mention of passengers' and shippers' claims against their carriers.
" According to United States case law as stated in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247
F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), and in Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393
(S.D. N.Y. 1952) the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action, it merely regulates
whatever causes of action already exist. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn supra note 29, at 517-19.39 Supra note 13, at 15.
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overthrown soon. It is useful to discuss which limits are most feasible in
a consolidated convention.
Since the limits of the different conventions are closely related (because
of the pervasive Warsaw pressure), the significant increase in the Mon-
treal Agreement's limit on recovery for fatalities will have a strong influ-
ence on limits in the other conventions if the Agreement is adopted
in an amended Warsaw Convention. The extent of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's interaction with other air law conventions was perceived by the
Canadian delegate to the 1966 Montreal meeting on the Warsaw Conven-
tion. He urged his fellow delegates to agree on new Warsaw limits "in
order to insure progress" of discussions of limits in the other conventions."
Negotiations for new limits on the Rome Convention are considered to be
futile until new limits for the Warsaw Convention are established.41
The focus of this paper being on the influence of the Montreal Agree-
ment, only the effect of its $75,000 limit of liablity will be discussed.
1. Uniform Limitation on Liability in a Consolidated Convention Based on
Absolute Liability.
In spite of the Montreal Agreement's higher limit on liability, it would
be more difficult to establish uniform limits than it would be to adopt
a uniform absolute liability system because of the greater variety of ex-
isting limits.
PASSENGERS AND SHIPPERS: If passengers are able to recover up
to the $75,000 limit of the Montreal Agrement from their own carriers,
then, in a consolidated convention, the passengers on the innocent plane in
an aerial collision should also be able to recover up to this limit from the
operator who caused the accident, since it has been decided that all pas-
sengers and shippers involved in a collision should be treated equally.
The same policy reasons would indicate that passengers should also be able
to recover up to this limit from ATC.
PEOPLE ON THE SURFACE: Since the Rome Convention's present
limit on recovery for fatalities is $33,164, an increase to $75,000 would
be substantial. However, proposals for increase of the Rome Convention up
to as high as $150,000 were heard at the 1966 Meeting of the ICAO
Subcommittee on the Rome Convention.' At this time it is certainly not
settled that a $75,000 limit could be established for surface injury to
people.
AIRCRAFT OPERATORS: If direct actions by passengers against oper-
ators were limited to $75,000 then recourse actions by one carrier against
another, or against ATC, could also be limited to this amount. It is difficult
to peg the operator's direct claims for damages against another operator or
against ATC at any specific figure. The measure of damages in the Draft
Convention on Aerial Collisions is a likely solution: the value of the air-
craft at the time of the collision or the cost of repairs or replacement,
whichever is the least. "3
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENCIES: As in the case of the operators
recourse actions, these claims by ATC could be made subject to the same
40 ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 at 18 (1966).
41 1966 Report of the ICAO Subcommittee on the Rome Convention, supra note 2, at 430-31.
4
2Id. at 431.
4Supra note 6, at Art. 10.
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uniform limit on passengers' claims. Direct claims by ATC, if classified as
surface damage, would be limited in the same way as would other surface
damage.
2. Limitation on Liability in a Consolidated Convention Based on Several
Liability Systems.
As indicated in the United States Proposal a consolidated convention
based on several liability systems would tend to have different limits for
the different claimants.
PASSENGERS AND SHIPPERS: Limitation of passengers' claims
against their carriers would tend to be influenced by the new limit in the
Montreal Agreement. The limitation on claims by passengers on the inno-
cent plane, against the operator causing the collision, would likewise be
influenced by the Montreal Agreement's $75,000 limit. However, the
United States Proposal favored that these parties be given an opportunity,
if they choose, to prove the causing operator's fault and thereby become
entitled to no limitation on the operator's liability." As for passengers' and
shippers' claims against ATC, the United States Proposal specifically wanted
a proof of fault system without a limit on liability. It should be noted,
however, that the majority of the ICAO Subcommittee voiced a preference
for limited liability, even if a proof of fault system were adopted.' If this
be the case, the new limit of the Montreal Agrement would become in-
fluential.
PEOPLE ON THE SURFACE: Claims of this group against operators
would, under the United States Proposal, be limited if based on absolute or
presumed liability." Again the limit of the Montreal Agreement would
become influential in establishing an acceptable limit on recovery for
persons killed or injured. The Proposal favored an option for this group
of claimants to prove the operator's fault; in which case they would be
entitled to no limitation on their recovery."
AIRCRAFT OPERATORS: The United States Proposal wanted opera-
tors recourse action to be based on proof of fault without a limitation on
liability. The courts under this scheme would apportion damages according
to degree of fault." Operators' direct actions against other operators and
against ATC would likewise be based on proof of fault without a limita-
tion on damages. 8
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENCIES: Recourse claims by ATC
would, under the United States Proposal, be treated like those of operators."
Direct claims would be grouped under surface damage.
Even if a consolidated convention were limited to surface, aerial collisions
and air traffic control damage, as suggested by the United States Proposal,
the Montreal Agreement's limit on liability would be influential in estab-
lishing the varying limits in these three areas.
4Supra note 6, at 229-30.451ICAO Doc. LC/SL/LATC No. 32 at 10 (1965).
46 Supra note 6, at 229-30.
47 Id.
4
1 id. at 230.
49 id. at 229.
'0Id. at 230.
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III. CONCLUSION
The 1965 United States notice to denounce the Warsaw Conventions'
and the compromise Montreal Agreement's basically different liability
regime have caused much bewilderment for the participants in air trans-
port. The Agreement's absolute liability system and the $75,000 limit are
now seeking general acceptance. In judging the Agreement's performance
it is necessary to consider as wide a spectrum of related facts as possible.
The passengers' and shippers' relationship with their carriers is inter-
twined with the passengers' and shippers' claims against the culpable opera-
tor in a collision and their claims against air traffic control; it is interwoven
with claims by people on the surface against carriers and air traffic control,
with operators' settlement of claims among themselves, with their claims
against air traffic control, and with claims by air traffic control agencies.
The great increase in air transport has not only increased the number of
participants, but it has increased the rate and size of conflicts among them.
This is the point where we begin to see that the Montreal Agreement
may offer a light in the morass. Its system of liability has a chance of
fairly wide acceptance, since it is already accepted in the Rome Conven-
tion. Such a system would be influential on liability systems to be estab-
lished for passengers' claims arising out of aerial collisions and for ATC
related claims. Its limitation on liability will strongly influence all claims
by passengers and even affect the limitation on liability for surface damage.
It is no understatement that consolidation of all the aviation liability
problems is a huge order to fill and that it would seem that it would be
easier to reduce the order by settling for a partial consolidation as sug-
gested by the United States Proposal. A partial consolidation does not
sufficiently solve the problem of recourse actions because the greatest
source of recourse actions is within the Warsaw Convention. Consequently,
if consolidation is even considered, it should, in this writer's opinion, in-
clude the Warsaw Convention. 2
Il 3 2 J. AiR L. & CoM. 246 (1966).
52 See Larsen, Air Traffic Control: A Recommendation for a Proof of Fault System Without a
Limitation on Liability, 32 J. Ant L. & CoM. 3, 22 (1966).
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